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Abstract 
 
Recent research has begun to challenge the received idea that Milgram’s ‘obedience’ 
experiments are demonstrations of obedience as typically understood (i.e. as social influence 
elicited in response to direct orders).  One key warrant for explaining the studies in terms of 
obedience has been the post-experiment interviews conducted with participants.  The present 
study uses data from archived audio recordings of these interviews to highlight the extent to 
which participants used rhetorical strategies emphasising obedience when pressed by the 
interviewer to account for their behaviour.  Previous research that has used these accounts as 
reports of underlying processes misses the extent to which they performed particular social 
actions in the context of their production.  It is concluded that the standard social 
psychological version of ‘obedience’ is present in the experiments after all, but in a rather 
different way than is typically assumed – rather than an empirical finding, obedience is a 
participants’ resource. 
 Keywords:  discourse, Milgram, obedience, rhetoric, social influence  
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Just following orders?  The rhetorical invocation of ‘obedience’ in Stanley Milgram’s post-
experiment interviews. 
Claiming obedience as a strategy for avoiding responsibility for one’s actions is 
inextricably associated with the Nuremburg trials of perpetrators of the Nazi Holocaust 
following the Second World War.  The claim to have been ‘just following orders’  functions 
to mitigate one’s culpability insofar as it positions oneself as having being a mere subsidiary 
actor in a chain of authority.  In legal terms, it is known as the defence of superior orders 
(e.g. Gaeta, 1999), and implies that those at higher levels in the chain of command are those 
who should really be held to account.  In social psychology, the study of obedience is of 
course most famously associated with Stanley Milgram.  Milgram – who was explicitly 
aiming to shed light on some of the psychological mechanisms that had led to the Holocaust – 
conducted a series of experiments at Yale University in the early 1960s which purported to 
show how orders from an authority figure could lead large numbers of US citizens to cause 
harm to an innocent person (Milgram, 1963, 1965a, 1974).  These studies, together with 
Hannah Arendt’s (1963/1977) thesis on the banality of evil, were key elements in the 
crystallization of a conventionalized view of the Holocaust as having being the result 
primarily of ordinary people being caught up in a bureaucratic process and simply following 
orders (Reicher, Haslam & Miller, 2014). 
 In recent years this perspective has come under increasing scrutiny from both 
historians and psychologists (e.g. Lang, 2014; Overy, 2014; Haslam & Reicher, 2007).  
Milgram’s studies were always controversial (e.g. Baumrind, 1964; Miller, 1986; Orne & 
Holland, 1968), but recent years have seen a new wave of critique which has brought into 
question the extent to which the studies can be seen as demonstrations of obedience at all.  
The present study seeks to extend this critique by drawing attention to hitherto under-
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explored aspects of Milgram’s own data – his interviews conducted with participants who 
had just completed the experiment.  Analysis of these data point to two key issues: 
First, it challenges the use of the post-experiment interviews as sources of objective 
data on responsibility.  Milgram (and others) have used these data to argue that ‘obedience’ is 
the product of a psychological shift whereby individuals no longer see themselves as 
responsible for their own actions.  Detailed analysis of the interviews suggests instead that 
participants were engaged in the contextually-contingent activity of accounting for their 
conduct in the situation immediately preceding the interview.  Any attempt to use these data 
which neglects this misses the extent to which participant accounts of responsibility serve a 
particular function in the specific social context of their production. 
Second, while recent research has cast doubt on Milgram’s experiments as 
demonstrations of obedience in terms of following orders, the present analysis will show that 
this version of ‘obedience’ does make an appearance in the experiments, albeit in a rather 
different way than is typically assumed.  Instead of providing a conceptual tool for analysts to 
explain Milgram’s experimental findings, it will instead be shown that ‘obedience’ can be re-
cast as a participants’ resource for making sense of – and accounting for – their behaviour in 
the experiment.  Before outlining these findings more fully, however, it is worth re-visiting 
some of the key elements of Milgram’s experiments, and their recent re-evaluation, in more 
detail. 
 
The ‘obedience’ experiments 
The ‘official’ account of Milgram’s experiments is well-known, but it is useful to 
provide a brief overview here in order to juxtapose it with the emerging re-evaluation of the 
studies to be discussed below.  Milgram (1974) reports 18 different experimental conditions, 
but it is arguable that a core group of these have come to constitute the most widely 
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disseminated version of the experiments.  This is due in no small part to the extent to which a 
particular condition dominates the narrative of Milgram’s (1965b) film of the experiments, 
which is widely used on undergraduate psychology courses and which has informed the 
broader circulation of Milgram’s ideas beyond academia (e.g. in Michael Almereyda’s 2015 
film Experimenter). 
 In these versions of the experiment, which correspond with conditions 2, 5, 6 and 8 in 
Milgram’s (1974) fullest account of the studies, a naïve participant arrived at a laboratory to 
take part in what was apparently an experiment on the effects of punishment on learning.  
The participant was greeted by an experimenter, and shortly afterwards another participant 
arrived.  Unbeknownst to the naïve participant, this second person was in fact a confederate.  
Through a rigged allocation process, the naïve participant was given the role of teacher, and 
the confederate the role of learner.  The experimenter explained that the teacher was required 
to administer a memory test to the learner, and to deliver punishments in the form of electric 
shocks when the learner made a mistake.  The shocks started from 15 volts, and increased in 
15-volt increments to a maximum of 450 volts.  The learner was strapped into a chair in an 
adjoining room, and electrodes were attached to his arm in order to deliver the shocks.  Once 
the procedure began, it became clear quite quickly that the learner was struggling with the 
task and that it would be necessary to move up the shock levels.  When the shocks reached 75 
volts, the learner began to grunt, and these exclamations escalated until the 150-volt shock 
was administered, at which point the learner demanded to be released.  If participants 
continued administering shocks beyond this point, the learner’s protests continued to increase 
in intensity along with the increasing shock levels.  At 300 volts the learner refused to answer 
any more, and shortly thereafter the protests ceased, creating the impression that he had 
perhaps lost consciousness.  Of course, the learner did not receive any real shocks and the 
protests were all pre-recorded on tape and played back at the appropriate shock level. 
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 If participants hesitated or refused to continue at any point, the experimenter had at 
his disposal four sequential prods that were to be used in order, and begun again for each 
separate attempt at defiance: 
Prod 1:  Please continue, or, Please go on. 
Prod 2:  The experiment requires that you continue. 
Prod 3:  It is absolutely essential that you continue. 
Prod 4:  You have no other choice, you must go on. 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 21, italics in original) 
Only if participants still resisted after receiving the fourth prod did the experimenter draw the 
session to a halt.  Milgram used his procedure to create a binary dependent variable whereby 
any participant who continued to the end of the shock generator, and thus administered all the 
shocks, was classified as obedient, whereas any participant who defied the experimenter and 
brought the session to a close was classified as disobedient.  Under these conditions, Milgram 
found obedience levels of between 50% and 65%.  However, in recent years the experiments 
have been subjected to a renewed level of critical scrutiny that has challenged the extent to 
which they were successful demonstrations of obedience at all. 
 
Obeying orders? 
Recent scholarship has drawn attention to a range of ethical (e.g. Nicholson, 2011; 
Perry, 2012), theoretical (e.g. Gibson, 2013a; Reicher & Haslam, 2011) and methodological 
(e.g. Gibson, 2013b; Russell, 2011) issues that challenge the received view of Milgram’s 
experiments.  For present purposes, one key emergent finding from this work is of particular 
note:  the suggestion that the experiments are not demonstrations of obedience as typically 
understood (i.e. as social influence elicited in response to a direct order), but rather that they 
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in fact stand as demonstrations of the overwhelming failure of attempts to exert influence 
through direct orders. 
 Specifically, it has been suggested that Milgram’s experimenter did not typically issue 
orders (Gibson, 2013a), and that most of the standardized prods fail to constitute orders as 
such.  For example, ‘Please continue’ appears to be a polite request rather than an order.  
Indeed, Reicher and Haslam (2011, p. 167) have suggested that it is only the fourth prod that 
constitutes an order or command, and have therefore argued that, ‘The question of whether or 
not people obey this fourth prompt is decisive in establishing the validity of those 
interpretations of Milgram’s studies that see them as a demonstration of how people follow 
orders.’  Recently, three lines of convergent evidence have suggested that the fourth prod was 
actually ineffective at getting participants to continue administering shocks.  Specifically, it 
has been shown that hardly any participants continued after receiving the fourth prod in a 
selection of Milgram’s experimental conditions (Gibson, 2013a); that no participants 
continued after receiving the fourth prod in a recent partial replication of Milgram’s paradigm 
(Burger, Girgis & Manning, 2011); and that the fourth prod was not particularly effective in 
an experimental analogue designed to unconfound the ordering of Milgram’s sequential prods 
(Haslam, Reicher & Birney, 2014).  It thus appears that, whatever Milgram’s experiments 
show, they do not show that people have a propensity to obey direct orders.  This raises the 
question of why, for over fifty years, the experiments have been understood in these terms.  
There are a number of reasons for this, not least amongst which is the extent to which they 
provided an explanation which chimed with other attempts to understand the processes that 
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The agentic state and the banality of evil 
The suggestion that the Holocaust was the product of a large number of people simply 
doing their jobs and unthinkingly following orders has proved to be remarkably durable.  As 
noted above, this is largely due to the twin intellectual influences of Milgram’s experiments 
and Arendt’s (1963/1977) ‘banality of evil’ thesis.  However, as many scholars have argued, 
the idea of the banality of evil is something of a simplification based on a mis-reading of 
Arendt’s account of the trial of Adolf Eichmann (e.g. Lang, 2014; Reicher, 2014).  In recent 
years, however, several scholars have set about systematically challenging the received view 
(e.g. Brannigan, 2013; Cesarani, 2004; Lang, 2014).  Haslam and Reicher (2007, 2008) 
summarize these critiques, with some scholars suggesting that Eichmann was engaged in a 
project of self-presentation to minimize his culpability during the early part of his trial.  
Several historians have argued that Eichmann was much more committed to the Nazi project 
than the ‘banality of evil’ thesis suggests, and – crucially – Cesarani (2004, p. 11) has argued 
that ‘It is a myth that Eichmann unthinkingly followed orders’.  This revised view is echoed 
in the wider literature on the Holocaust (e.g. Fenigstein, 2015; Mastroianni, 2015; Overy, 
2014), which has cast doubt on the idea that the Nazi atrocities were the result of people 
simply doing their duty and blindly following orders.  These debates are far from settled, but 
they nevertheless highlight the extent to which the ‘banality of evil’ thesis is no longer 
tenable as a straightforward understanding of the Holocaust. 
 This critique of the received view of Eichmann has important echoes in the way in 
which the ‘obedience’ experiments have been interpreted.  Milgram’s (1974) own theoretical 
account of his findings was based on the idea of the agentic state.  Milgram suggested that 
obedience involved a psychological shift in which individuals no longer feel themselves to be 
in control of their own actions, but rather are merely an agent for the commands of an 
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authority figure.  In this respect, Milgram’s explanation complements the ‘banality of evil’ 
thesis, and indeed this is hardly surprising given that Milgram was explicitly influenced by 
Arendt’s work during the formulation of his theoretical account (Blass, 2004).  Milgram 
argued that, 
Arendt’s conception of the banality of evil comes closer to the truth than one might 
dare imagine.  The ordinary person who shocked his victim did so out of a sense of 
obligation – a conception of his duties as a subject – and not from any particularly 
aggressive tendencies. 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 6, italics in original) 
This highlights the extent to which Milgram was keen to contrast his account with 
personality-based explanations for authoritarian behaviour (e.g. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, 
Levinson & Sanford, 1950; and see Elms & Milgram, 1966).  Importantly, Milgram’s 
interpretation relied on the self-reported responses of participants in post-experiment 
interviews.  In the early experimental conditions, participants completed a measure in which 
they attributed responsibility for administering shocks against the learner’s will.  Milgram 
used an instrument resembling a pie chart, termed the ‘responsibility clock’ (see Milgram, 
1974, p. 204) which enabled participants to divide responsibility between the experimenter, 
the learner and themselves. 
 Milgram (1974) reports that participants who had continued with the experiment until 
the highest level on the shock generator (i.e. ‘obedient’ participants) attributed less 
responsibility to themselves compared to participants who had defied the experimenter.  This 
finding is used to support the suggestion that ‘obedient’ participants no longer perceived 
themselves as being fully in control of their actions, but were rather merely acting out the 
demands of the authority figure.  Taken together, Milgram’s work and the idea of the banality 
of evil exerted a powerful hold on attempts to make sense of the Holocaust, to the extent that 
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it has been suggested that they ‘straightjacketed research for two decades’ (Cesarani, 2004, p. 
15). 
However, Milgram’s theoretical explanation has long been regarded as flawed , even 
by the most sympathetic of commentators (e.g. Blass, 2004; Miller, 1986).  In particular, 
Mantell and Panzarella (1976) cast doubt on the extent to which the responsibility data 
actually support Milgram’s theory.  In this context, it might be argued that Milgram’s 
responsibility data and the agentic state theory have been conclusively discarded and further 
consideration of these issues is not warranted.  However, the received view of Milgram’s 
findings still enjoys pre-eminence in textbook accounts (Griggs & Whitehead, 2015a, b), and 
indeed the issue of responsibility is still very much a live one in recent work on obedience.  
For example, Caspar, Christensen, Cleeremans and Haggard (2016) have recently used 
measures of electrophysiological activity to argue that coercive conditions lead to a reduced 
sense of agency.  They conclude that the defence of ‘just following orders’ may not simply be 
an excuse but instead reflects people’s experiential reality.  There has even been a recent 
attempt to rehabilitate the concept of the agentic state, with Fennis and Aarts (2012) 
suggesting that a reduction in perceptions of personal control increases susceptibility to social 
influence, and explicitly framing this in terms of Milgram’s theory. 
Of most direct relevance to the present study, however, is Burger, Girgis and 
Manning’s (2011) analysis of participants’ post-experiment comments following a partial 
replication of Milgram’s paradigm (Burger, 2009).  It is worth considering this study, and its 
relationship with Milgram’s own analysis, in more detail, and in particular the assumptions 
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Accepting and denying responsibility 
It was noted above that advocates of the ‘banality of evil’ thesis have been challenged 
on the grounds that they may have been taken in by Eichmann’s attempts at self-presentation.  
Milgram dismisses similar explanations for his own participants’ denial of responsibility:  
‘The most frequent defense of the individual who has performed a heinous act under 
command of authority is that he has simply done his duty.  In asserting this defense, 
the individual is not introducing an alibi concocted for the moment but is reporting 
honestly on the psychological attitude induced by submission to authority’ (Milgram, 
1974, p. 146). 
Given that in other respects, Milgram’s research has been used to show people’s inability to 
appreciate the impact of social forces on their behaviour, it is perhaps surprising that he was 
so ready to treat these post-experiment accounts as straightforward verbal reports of 
underlying processes.  We can understand this as an example of selective reification (Potter, 
1996), in which the analyst selectively identifies some accounts as flawed, while choosing to 
reify – to treat as literally true – others.  Similar assumptions can be identified in Burger et 
al’s (2011) research. 
Burger et al (2011) undertook a content analysis of participant responses in Burger’s 
(2009) partial replication of the Milgram experiment.  In one set of analyses, Burger et al 
focussed on whether participants had made comments at any stage during the experimental 
session or post-experiment debriefing interview that indicated that they took responsibility 
for the potential consequences of their actions during the experiments.  In both the 
experimental sessions and the interviews, defiant participants were more likely to state that 
they were personally responsible than participants who continued past the 150 volt shock 
level (the highest level in Burger’s procedure).  Burger et al argued that ‘[t]he results support 
the notion that a sense of personal responsibility contributed to the participants’ decision to 
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continue or end the procedure during Burger’s (2009) replication of Milgram’s studies’ 
(Burger et al, 2011, p. 463). 
However, this explanation relies on the same set of assumptions about the status of 
participant accounts as does Milgram’s use of his post-experiment interviews.  Indeed, 
Burger et al explicitly address the issue of the believability of the comments: 
‘Because the spontaneous comments came without prompting and because 
participants were unlikely to have anticipated that these comments would be analyzed 
by the investigators, the comments provide a unique and relatively uncensored 
glimpse into what participants were thinking as they moved through the experimental 
procedures’ (Burger et al, 2011, p. 461). 
We suggest that such an assumption is not warranted, and indeed that it results from a 
longstanding neglect of the constructive and functional nature of language in social 
psychology.  Instead, a position informed by discursive-rhetorical psychology highlights the 
extent to which language should be understood as an action-oriented medium where people 
do not simply describe the world, but rather they construct it. 
 
Discursive-rhetorical psychology 
Since the ‘turn to language’ in the 1980s, a number of approaches within social 
psychology have sought to take seriously the argument that language is not a relatively 
straightforward and transparent medium for the communication of thoughts from one mind to 
another, but rather that it is a fundamentally action-oriented medium which is geared towards 
doing things.  For example, conversation analysts have highlighted the virtues of detailed 
analysis of interaction on a line-by-line basis to show how social order is maintained in the 
most mundane of contexts (e.g. Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998).  By contrast, discourse analysts 
influenced by Foucauldian perspectives have sought to map the contours of power and 
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ideology within language (e.g. Parker, 1992).  Other scholars, drawing on Gilbert and 
Mulkay’s (1984) characterization of their study of scientists’ discourse as occupying ‘a 
middle ground’ (p. 17) position, have attempted to plot a course between micro and macro 
approaches to the analysis of discourse, and the present study proceeds in a similar spirit.  
Thus, for present purposes we want to draw together strands from Potter and Wetherell’s 
(1987) classic outline of discourse analysis, Edwards and Potter’s (1992; Potter & Edwards, 
2001) subsequent development of discursive psychology, and Billig’s (1996) rhetorical 
psychology perspective.  For ease of reference we term this approach discursive-rhetorical 
psychology (DRP), and it is worth briefly outlining four key propositions that we derive from 
it. 
Discourse as constructive.  DRP conceptualises discourse as inherently constructive.  
Rather than merely reflecting the way the world is, it is instead through language that we 
construct the world.  Analytically, therefore, describing something as a fact, for example, is 
not to be assessed in terms of the extent to which the claim really is factual, but rather it is to 
be analysed for how specific terms are deployed in such a way as to create the impression of 
factuality (Potter, 1996). 
Discourse as functional.  When people are speaking, they are not simply reporting on 
the world as it is, but rather their words are geared towards action.  Language is used to 
perform a whole manner of social actions, such as requesting, blaming, excusing, identifying, 
promising, and so on.  Moreover, the action-orientation of a formulation is not determined by 
its grammatical form.  Something that is ostensibly a statement (e.g. ‘It’s rather warm in 
here’) can – in an appropriate context – be treated as a request (e.g. if, on hearing the 
utterance, someone goes to open a window). 
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Discourse as situated.  DRP directs analytic attention towards the specific contexts in 
which discourse is used.  Rather than treating accounts as reflective of psychological or social 
reality, DRP conceptualizes them as tied to the business of the immediate social context.  
Discourse as rhetorical.  Finally, DRP emphasises the extent to which discourse is 
fundamentally rhetorical insofar as people are constantly engaged in activities designed to 
persuade others of something.  This extends far beyond self-evidently adversarial encounters 
to encompass the full range of mundane and everyday situations in which an overarching 
concern with accountability can be identified.  By this is meant that in the course of everyday 
life people are constantly orienting to the possibility that they may be held to account for their 
actions in one way or another. 
Previous research on Milgram’s studies has applied this approach to the experimental 
interaction between the experimenter and participant, with a particular focus on the way in 
which participants sought to argue their way out of the experiments, and the way in which the 
experimenter adapted the standardized procedure in an attempt to keep participants in the 
experiment (Gibson, 2013a, b, 2014, 2017a; also see Hollander, 2015; Hollander & Maynard, 
2016).  In this previous research, it has been argued that the experimental interaction between 
experimenter and participant should be understood as a rhetorical encounter; here, we suggest 
that the interactions in the post-experimental interviews should be seen in similar terms.  
Whereas Milgram – and others, such as Burger et al (2011) – have used such interviews as a 
source of information about underlying processes, we conceptualize these encounters as 
occasions on which participants were constructing discourse in order to perform particular 
actions in the specific social context in which they found themselves.  Moreover, participants 
will be in a position of having to account for their behaviour, and as such, a failure to 
conceptualise the interviews as rhetorical encounters will misconstrue the nature of these 
encounters.  Such an analysis is overdue:  The acceptance of the flaws in Milgram’s account 
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has not led to further consideration of the data used by Milgram to develop his agentic state 
theory.  Our guiding research questions were thus, how is obedience invoked in the 
interviews, and what is it doing on those occasions when it is invoked?  The present analysis 
therefore addressed the question of how this classic understanding of obedience – as 
following orders – is invoked by participants themselves as they account for their behaviour 




The data are drawn from condition 02 of Milgram’s experiment, first reported by 
Milgram (1965a), and also included in his book-length account of the studies (Milgram, 
1974).  This condition, known as the voice-feedback condition, was selected for use in the 
present analysis as it is the only condition that uses both the procedure described above and 
the responsibility clock instrument.  Forty participants – all males – took part in the 
condition, 25 (62.5%) of whom proceeded to the highest point on the shock generator and 
were thus classified as obedient by Milgram.  The condition was conducted in late August 
1961, beginning just a few days after the judges in the Eichmann trial had retired to consider 
their verdict. 
In common with most of Milgram’s experimental conditions, audio recordings from 
the voice-feedback condition are held in the Stanley Milgram Papers archive at Yale 
University.  Thirty-nine experimental sessions from the voice-feedback condition are present 
in the archive.  For the purposes of the present analysis, the post-experiment interviews were 
transcribed in full using a simplified form of Jeffersonian transcription notation to capture the 
content of the interviews as well as some basic interactional features such as pauses, overlap 
and false starts (see Appendix for conventions). 
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The interviews were conducted immediately after the completion of the experimental 
session, either by John Williams, still in his role as experimenter, or by Milgram himself.  At 
the time the interviews were conducted, participants had not been informed that the 
experimental set-up was a hoax, and indeed they were not told this until much later when 
they received a written report on the experiments (Perry, 2012).  In neither of the publications 
in which the condition is reported (Milgram, 1965, 1974) are details of the interview schedule 
reported, however the interviews typically involved the participants being asked to explain 
the experiment in their own words, and being asked to improvise a ‘story’ based on a picture 
in which punishment is being administered to what appears to be a misbehaving schoolboy.  
Participants were also asked to complete a number of measures, of which all but the 
responsibility clock were completed via paper and pencil.  At various points throughout this 
process, the interviewer could ask participants to expand on their answers, and particular 
lines of questioning appear to have been improvised depending upon the actions of 
participants in the experimental sessions (e.g. participants who laughed could be asked about 
the reasons for this).  In modern parlance, the interviews appear to have followed what might 




Analysis involved the identification of terms that can be said to relate to the standard 
social psychological definition of obedience – the defence of superior orders.  Thus, 
references to following orders/instructions/commands, doing as one is told, and similar 
formulations were treated as part of the same interpretative system, or repertoire.  Potter and 
Wetherell (1987, p. 149) defined interpretative repertoires as ‘recurrently used systems of 
terms used for characterizing actions, events and other phenomena.’ 
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 The interview transcripts were read repeatedly to identify instances of the obedience 
repertoire, and more broadly to ascertain how the discussions of responsibility and related 
issues unfolded.  At first, the analysis aimed at over-inclusion, so that borderline cases were 
retained.  These included cases where the interviewer (rather than participants) invoked 
orders/commands, and where more oblique references were made to the experimenter being 
‘in charge’ of the experiments.  Subsequent readings refined this analysis to the point where 
only those occasions where the repertoire was used by participants clearly in reference to 
themselves were included in the analytic corpus.  The resulting data were again read 
repeatedly with a view to identifying in more detail how participants invoked the superior 
orders defence.  At this stage, the micro-interactional features of the interviews were attended 
to, with a particular focus on the use of specific discursive devices and techniques (Edwards 
& Potter, 1992).  An over-arching principle was the concern for the four key elements of the 
DRP approach outlined above:  the analysis sought to explore how the superior orders 
defence was constructed, what functions it performed, how it was situated in its specific 
context of articulation, and how it formed part of particular rhetorical strategies designed to 
mitigate participants’ responsibility for their actions.  In short, we were concerned with the 
situated construction of superior orders for the performance of particular rhetorical actions. 
 
Analysis & Discussion 
In presenting the analysis, two major findings will be highlighted:  First, it will be 
shown how the obedience repertoire was used by participants as a strategy in accounting for 
shocking the learner against his will.  Second, attention will be drawn to the role of the 
interviewer in these exchanges, and in particular to what might best be described as the use of 
a strategy of ‘active’ interviewing to hold participants to account.  Ultimately, the post-
experiment interviews did not access participants’ feelings of responsibility in any 
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straightforward, neutral or objective sense, but rather they made responsibility a matter of 
contestation and accountability. 
 
Obedience as accounting strategy 
A total of 13 (12 obedient; 1 defiant) participants drew on the superior orders 
repertoire in the post-experiment interviews.  As Milgram (1974) himself noted, many 
participants did indeed attribute responsibility to the experimenter, and/or sought to downplay 
their own responsibility in various ways.  However, even a cursory listen to the recordings of 
the interviews indicates that participants were not passively responding to the use of the 
responsibility clock, but rather they were in a situation in which they were providing an 
account for their behaviour.  The first extract illustrates the use of the responsibility clock, 
featuring discussions concerning the percentage of responsibility to be allocated to the 
experimenter (E), teacher (T) and learner (L).  The extract begins after the experimenter has 
explained the responsibility clock and asked the participant (teacher) to position the arms of 
the clock in order to indicate his allocation of responsibility.  During the opening lines of the 
extract, the participant is providing an account of the reasons for his allocation: 
 
Extract 1 (0218; 450v.) 
1 T: I don’t think he had much 
2  responsibility because he had 
3  nothing to say into- into the 
4  matter. So his would be very 
5  small. I say yours was more so 
6  because you’re experimenting 
7  and you knew, you told me 
THE RHETORICAL INVOCATION OF OBEDIENCE    19 
8  exactly what to do and I was 
9  doing what you told me. 
10 E: Mmhm 
11 T: So it would maybe something 
12  like that. 
13 E: So you’d give the learner about 
14  ten percent 
15 T: Yeah. 
16 E: And you’d give yourself about 
17  thirty percent. 
18 T: Thirty, yeah. 
19 E: Yeah, and you’d give me, er, 
20  well you’d give me the rest 
21  about sixty percent. 
22 T: Yeah 
23 E: [I see] 
24 T: [Because] I was certainly 
25  following instructions 
 
The participant attributes more responsibility to the experimenter on the grounds that 
the experimenter knew what he was doing (line 7: ‘you knew’) and that he told the participant 
what to do (lines 7-9; lines 24-25).  It is worth considering the precise way in which the 
participant invokes the obedience repertoire here.  The reference to the experimenter knowing 
what he was doing functions to attribute epistemic authority to the experimenter such that the 
participant not only positions himself as doing what he was told, but doing so because the 
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experimenter was in a better position than he was to understand what was going on.  The 
subsequent formulation ‘you told me exactly what to do’ (lines 7-8) also functions to attribute 
responsibility to the experimenter insofar as it implies that no leeway was available for the 
participant to use his judgement – every action was precisely determined by the experimenter. 
 Following the use of the responsibility measure, the participant provides a further 
brief account.  He gives the experimenter the largest share of the responsibility, and the 
experimenter glosses this as ‘about sixty per cent’ (line 21).  This is not simply treated as a 
factual statement by the participant, who instead orients to the need for an account and again 
uses the obedience repertoire, this time with the added firmness of ‘I was certainly following 
instructions’ (lines 24-25) to leave no room for doubt.  This formulation also removes the 
experimenter’s agency insofar as it is simply ‘instructions’ rather than ‘you’ or ‘your 
instructions’ that the participant has followed.  Insofar as the denial of one’s own 
responsibility in this situation necessitates an attribution of responsibility to the experimenter, 
who is also acting as interviewer, this highlights a further nuance of the situation in that 
attributing blame in such a way can also be seen as a face-threatening and accountable action. 
This account is in many respects a canonical use of the obedience repertoire in that 
there is no orientation to the possibility that following instructions might itself be 
accountable.  Instead, the simple claim to have been doing the bidding of someone with 
greater knowledge of the situation is sufficient to warrant the attribution of greater 
responsibility to the experimenter. 
The use of the obedience repertoire was not restricted to discussions that arose from 
the use of the formal measure of responsibility.  In many interviews, matters of responsibility 
were also raised by the interviewer in a more general sense.  In the following example, 
Milgram (SM) has been asking the participant about his impressions of the level of pain 
experienced by the learner: 
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Extract 2 (Participant 0201; 450v.) 
1 SM: Did you- did you hear him 
2  hollering? 
3 T: Yes. 
4 SM: H- what did you, how did you 
5  feel about that? 
6 T: I felt rather, gui-eh-lty. 
7 SM: Why? 
8 T: Cos I was still er giving him the 
9  shocks. 
10 SM: Uhuh.  Well er, why did you 
11  give him the shocks then? 
12 T: Why did I give him the shocks? 
13 SM: Yeah. 
14 T: Because the er, other fellow told 
15  me to continue, exactly as the, 
16  the word said. 
 
In this extract the participant uses the obedience repertoire in response to the 
interviewer pressing him as to why he had continued.  The interviewer’s initial questions are 
seemingly innocuous but function to position the participant as having blatantly disregarded 
the learner’s ‘hollering’.  The first question addresses the seemingly straightforward 
perceptual matter of whether the participant had heard the learner’s protests (lines 1-2), and 
the second concerns how he felt about the ‘hollering’ (lines 4-5).  These questions create a 
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moral ambiguity:  If you can hear someone in pain, and you feel guilty because you are 
causing the pain, then the appropriate and obvious thing to do is to stop performing the action 
that is the cause of the pain, and yet the participant did not.  The interviewer’s subsequent 
question addresses this incongruity by asking why he continued to administer the shocks 
(lines 10-11) and it is at this point that the participant draws on the obedience repertoire to 
account for his actions (lines 14-16).  Again, there is no orientation here to the possibility that 
doing as he was told was in any sense problematic in itself. 
In addition to straightforward invocations of following orders and similar 
formulations, participants could construct analogies with other situations in order to 
normalise their behaviour.  For example, in extract 3, we see a participant explaining why he 
has attributed a greater proportion of responsibility to himself than to the experimenter: 
 
Extract 3 (Participant 0219; 345v.) 
1 T: so I do believe that 
2  (2) 
3 T: eh, in my case here I would take 
4  the greater punishment of him 
5 E: The [greater responsibility.] 
6 T: [The greater respons]ibility to 
7  him. 
8 E:  Yeah, but not as much as I 
9  [((inaudible))] 
10 T: [But not as] much as you 
11  because, you be the experimenter 
12  let us say, if you work in a place 
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13  you’re the boss 
14 E: mm 
15 T: So you tell me what to do. 
 
The participant here attributes more responsibility to the experimenter than to himself, and 
justifies this using an analogy with a workplace in which the experimenter is ‘the boss’.  The 
category-defining features of a ‘boss’ involve the power to make decisions, with the 
concomitant responsibility for their consequences.  In this respect, we might understand the 
participants’ analogy as a form of rhetorical anchoring (Billig, 1991; Moscovici, 1984) 
insofar as it is used to frame a novel and unfamiliar situation (i.e. the experiment) in terms of 
a more familiar setting with clearly defined – and consensually understood – roles (i.e. a 
workplace).  In this respect, the assertion that ‘you tell me what to do’ ( line 15) not only 
functions as an account for the participants’ behaviour, but also as a justification for 
attributing greater responsibility to the experimenter.  Thus once again not only is the 
obedience repertoire used to manage accountability, but doing as one is told is not i tself 
oriented to as accountable. 
However, in some cases participants could orient to obedience as accountable even as 
they were drawing on the obedience repertoire to manage their accountability for having 
administered shocks to the learner: 
 
Extract 4 (Participant 0206; 450v.) 
1 T: Oh I- I felt somewhat 
2  uncomfortable giving him the 
3  shocks to be honest with you. 
4 E: You did? 
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5 T: Yeah. 
6 E: And you continued to do so 
7  though. 
8 T: Well you told me to d- d- do so. 
9 E: Yeah well I s- 
10 T: I mean I hesitated several times 
11  and you can- tell me to keep 
12  going.  As a matter of fact er 
13  long before I reached the end 
14  of that board I was tempted to 
15  get a- get away from it. 
16 E: You were? 
17 T: But er- 
18 E: Why didn’t you? 
19 T: Because you were there 
20  telling me to carry on. 
21  (2) 
22 E: Even erm, o- over this man’s er, 
23  our learner’s complaints you, er 
24  continued to go on, with me 
25  giving the er, the command. 
26 T: (?I was just?) following  
27  instructions maybe I’m a- an  
28  Eichmann eh heh.  But er, I  
29  really didn’t- didn’t want to 
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30  continue. 
31 E: Maybe you were a- maybe you 
32  were a what? 
33 T: Eichmann.  Eh heh. 
34 E: Eichmann. 
35 T: I really didn’t want to continue 
36  even er when I reached the end 
37  of the board there I was hoping 
38  I could start over again on the 
39  lower voltage.  And er, o- only 
40  because you e- e- sternly told 
41  me to carry on I did eh heh. 
42 E: I see. 
43 T: But er, I really didn’t want to. 
 
In this extract, the interviewer repeatedly puts the participant in a position where he 
needs to account for his actions.  The participant attempts to maintain as positive a self-
presentation as possible by constructing a disjuncture between his outward behaviours and his 
internal processes.  This is insufficient on its own to satisfy the interviewer, who then 
proceeds to hold him to account for not bringing his behaviour into line with his internal 
state.  In this context, obedience is a useful accounting strategy for the participant insofar as it 
treats the role of a third party (i.e. the person issuing orders) as key to his continuation and as 
providing an explanation for the disjuncture between internal state and outward behaviour.  It 
is useful to explore in detail how this process unfolds. 
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The participant’s initial assertion of discomfort in administering the shocks comes in 
response to a preceding discussion in which the experimenter – now in the role of interviewer 
– had asked the participant to explain the purpose of the experiment in his own words (a 
typical opening question in these interviews).  At this stage, therefore, there is no indication 
that the participant is to be pressed on his reasons for continuing and as such his claim bears 
the hallmarks of confession (line 3: ‘to be honest with you’) in which he is bringing to the 
experimenter’s attention the fact that the experiment made him feel uncomfortable, while 
doing so in such a way as to mark it as dispreferred (Edwards & Fasulo, 2006).  Such an 
assertion might ordinarily be oriented to as requiring an account in itself (i.e. because it can 
be heard as being critical of the experimenter), but of course the experimenter does no such 
thing and instead turns the rhetorical tables on the participant with his statement on lines 6-7.  
Note that this is not formulated as a direct accusation, or even as a question.  In taking the 
grammatical form of merely observing that the participant had continued despite the feeling 
of discomfort, the experimenter nevertheless draws attention to an inconsistency between the 
participant’s stated feelings (discomfort) and his actions (continuing with the task that is the 
cause of this discomfort). 
 The participant immediately responds to this, beginning with an appositional (line 8: 
well).  Such words are commonly found at the beginning of speaking turns, and function as 
turn-entry devices, or what we might describe as devices for seizing the floor (Sacks, 
Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974).  In this context the appositional serves as a form of ‘yes but’ 
formulation (Pomerantz, 1984) in that it acknowledges what has just been said but rejects the 
implication (Schiffrin, 1985; see also Gibson, 2017a).  The participant is thus meeting the 
implied contradiction by placing responsibility for continuation on the experimenter (‘you 
told me to d- d- do so’).  The experimenter attempts to respond in kind (line 9: ‘Yeah well’) 
but is cut off as the participant expands on his account.  In doing so, the participant works up 
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his reluctance to continue both in behavioural (line 10: ‘I hesitated several times’) and 
psychological (lines 14-15: ‘I was tempted to get a- get away from it’) terms.  This serves to 
construct a description of himself as a reluctant continuer who would not have gone on 
without the instructions of the experimenter.  A number of discursive devices are used to 
build this impression of himself.  For example, the reference to hesitating several times 
constructs his resistance as persistent.  Similarly, he prefaces his assertion that he was 
tempted to end the experiment by constructing it as a fact (line 12: ‘As a matter of fact’) and 
as something that had occurred to him ‘long before I reached the end’ (line 13).  Thus, he is 
able to position himself as having wanted to discontinue, and as having displayed outward 
indications of his lack of willingness, but as having continued because he was told to do so.  
This strategy serves to maintain something of a moral position for the participant as a 
basically good person, while placing the responsibility for continuation firmly with the 
experimenter. 
 In response to the participant’s claim to have been tempted to end the experiment, the 
experimenter then asks simply ‘Why didn’t you?’  This again places the responsibility back 
with the participant, who again asserts that the reason he didn’t stop is due to the 
experimenter ‘telling me to carry on’ (line 20).  The experimenter’s response juxtaposes the 
‘commands’ to continue with ‘our learner’s complaints’ (line 23), to which the participant 
again invokes the experimenter’s ‘instructions’.  It is not entirely clear from the recording, 
but it sounds as though the participant begins this phrase with ‘I was just’, and the use of 
‘just’ functions to minimise the gravity of his actions in line with the canonical ‘just 
following orders’ phrase.  In any case, his subsequent suggestion that he may be ‘an 
Eichmann’ (lines 27-8) clearly shows that he is orienting to the potential parallels between his 
line of argument and the classic view of Eichmann developing at the time.  Following this, he 
uses extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) to re-assert his lack of willingness to go on 
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(lines 28-30: ‘I really didn’t- didn’t want to continue.)  This continues on lines 35-43 as the 
participant works up descriptions of his inner states (lines 35 & 43: ‘I really didn’t want to’; 
line 37: ‘I was hoping’) and again contrasts these with the instructions of the experimenter.  It 
is notable that in this final formulation of the experimenter’s prodding, the participant 
upgrades the previous glosses of the experimenter’s instructions.  Now, instead of simply 
telling him to go on, the experimenter is constructed as having sternly told him to continue 
(line 40).  Obedience is thus used as a strategy for managing the apparently – and self-
confessed – inconsistency between internal desire (not wanting to continue) and outward 
behaviour (continuing to administer the shocks). 
It is worth dwelling on the invocation of Eichmann a moment.  As noted above, this 
experimental condition occurred at a time when Eichmann’s trial was salient and as such the 
moral issues it raised were an important contemporary concern.  In orienting to these issues, 
the participant employs a formulation resembling a rhetorical strategy that Antaki and 
Wetherell (1999) have termed a show concession, in which an assertion is followed by an 
apparent concession, which is in turn followed by a restatement of the original assertion.  
This acknowledges, while attempting to dismiss, a potential weakness in the participant’s 
argument.  In this instance, the original assertion (‘I was just following instructions’) and its 
restatement (‘But er, I really didn’t- didn’t want to continue’) are not directly equivalent, but 
both function to position the participant as having continued despite not wanting to do so.  
This concession allows the participant to appear reflexive by acknowledging Eichmann as 
being a problematic figure, and in so doing to avoid alignment with Eichmann insofar as this 
is acknowledged by the invocation itself and by the laughter particles.  Importantly, this 
displays the participant’s orientation to the accountability of the obedience repertoire itself, 
over and above the accountability of the act of delivering shocks against someone’s will. 
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The participant’s strategy appears to constitute a good example of Milgram’s claims 
about those who went all the way on the shock generator being more inclined to pass 
responsibility to the experimenter.  However, in the immediate situation in which they found 
themselves, passing responsibility was one of the best available options for maintaining as 
positive an impression of themselves as possible.  Constructing a mis-match between desire 
and behaviour, and using obedience as a device to account for this, represented – in the 
circumstances – the best strategy for presenting the self as fundamentally moral:  I may have 
done this thing that I might have been better off not doing, but at least I didn’t want to do it. 
 
‘Active’ interviewing 
We have already seen how participants were held to account for their behaviour in the 
experimental session, and in this sense it is not the case that they were simply completing a 
straightforward measure of their perceptions of responsibility.  Invocations of the obedience 
repertoire can thus usefully be understood as accounting strategies for impression 
management in the face of the interviewer’s probes.  In this second section of the analysis, we 
extend this line of argument further to focus in more detail on the interviewer’s role in the 
production of the responsibility data.  Specifically, we will suggest that the interviewing style 
adopted by Milgram and Williams was essentially an adversarial one that has some 
similarities with more recent notions of ‘active’ interviewing (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995).  
We do not wish to overstate this comparison by anachronistically projecting back a 
contemporary concept, but we would suggest that the way in which Milgram’s interviews 
were conducted is much closer to what is currently understood as active interviewing than to 
any notion of the non-interventionist interviewer who attempts to maintain neutrality and 
minimise bias.  Indeed, there are also similarities here with early discourse analytic advice on 
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interviewing, in which researchers were encouraged ‘to make the interview a much more 
interventionist and confrontative arena than is normal’ (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 164).  
In the first extract in this section, participant 0201 is being interviewed by Stanley 
Milgram, who creates the impression that he had not been aware of the precise details of what 
had occurred in the experimental session.  He uses this ambiguous status to pose ‘naïve’ 
questions which function to hold the participant to account.  The extract – which occurs 
shortly after the section of the interview presented above as extract 2 – begins with Milgram 
asking the participant why he didn’t stop administering the shocks at the point at which the 
learner demanded to be released: 
 
Extract 5 (0201; 450v.) 
1 SM: Why didn’t you stop at that 
2  point? 
3  (3) 
4 T: Why didn’t I stop? 
5 SM: Yeah. 
6 T: Because the man told me to 
7  continue. 
8 SM: He told you to continue even 
9  when the er, learner told you to 
10  stop? 
11 T: That’s correct. 
12 SM: Why did you listen to that man 
13  rather than the man that was 
14  getting hurt. 
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15 T: Apparently he knows what he’s 
16  doing. 
17 SM: Well the man in there knows 
18  that he’s getting hurt. 
19  (7) 
20 T: Well I was er, right in the 
21  middle I didn’t know which 
22  way to turn I- 
23  (4) 
24 T: I felt sorry for the man outside 
25  and 
26  (2) 
27 T: I thought the experiment er, 
28  depended on my going ahead. 
29 SM: Uhuh.  Well what about, him, 
30  didn’t he have some er, I mean 
31  rights as a person? 
32  (3) 
33 T: Certainly. 
34  (2) 
35 SM: Well, was one of his rights the 
36  er, the right to stop being, given 
37  an electric shock when he didn’t 
38  want anymore? 
39  (5) 
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40 T: Oh yes, yeah. Yep. 
41 SM: Well why did you give it to him 
42  then? 
43  (3) 
44 T: eh heh nobody told me to stop. 
45 SM: Uhuh.  But he told you to stop. 
46  (4) 
47 T: That’s true but he’s just- but he 
48  was just the er 
49  (6) 
50 T: subject sh- shall we say. 
 
The participant’s initial account for failing to stop draws on the obedience repertoire 
(lines 6-7: ‘Because the man told me to continue.’)  Milgram then works up his seeming 
naivety concerning the events of the experiment by asking for clarification.  By creating the 
impression that the events of the experimental session were somewhat unexpected, Milgram 
places the onus on the participant to account for his behaviour in failing to draw proceedings 
to a halt.  There is the implication that the experimenter might himself be held to account for 
this failure too, but Milgram’s pressing of the participant is notable in that it challenges his 
account for continuing in several ways.  First, Milgram contrasts the experimenter with ‘the 
man that was getting hurt’ (lines 13-14).  This makes relevant a normative response that if 
someone is being hurt then others are obliged to do what they can to assist, and in so doing 
puts the participant in a position where an account is required for breaching this norm.  
Second, after the participant responds to his previous question by mobilising the 
experimenter’s apparent expertise (lines 15-16: ‘Apparently he knows what he’s doing’), 
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Milgram contrasts the ‘apparent’ knowledge of the experimenter with the learner’s 
knowledge of his experiences of ‘getting hurt’ (line 18).  He then focuses on the learner’s 
rights in order to suggest that the participant has disregarded the learner’s basic ‘rights as a 
person’ (line 31).  Asking loaded questions, Milgram first gets the participant to agree that 
the learner did indeed have some basic rights (lines 29-30), and subsequently that one of 
these rights entailed not being given an electric shock against his will (lines 25-28).  Both 
these questions are loaded in that they are formulated in such a way as to make disagreement 
difficult, and indeed the participants’ agreements come after noticeable delays in both cases.  
Having elicited these agreements, Milgram then asks the participant why he continued 
administering the shock (lines 41-42) – in effect why he behaved in such a way as to deny the 
rights which he had readily agreed were due to the learner.  This again shows how the 
interviewer could construct incongruity between belief and action in order to hold 
participants to account.  The participant’s response (line 44: ‘nobody told me to stop’) 
positions him as simply doing what he was told such that he would have stopped only if 
instructed to do so.  When Milgram points out that the learner told him to stop (line 45), the 
participant invokes the power relations inherent in the situation (lines 47-50: ‘he was just the 
… subject’), with the term ‘subject’ in particular drawing on contemporaneous norms 
concerning the role and status of research participants.  Again, we see obedience being 
invoked as a way of downplaying responsibility when being held accountable.  Milgram’s 
questioning is not designed for the straightforward elicitation of information, but rather it 
functions to hold the participant to account, to challenge his motives, and even his morality, 
in continuing with the experiment past the point at which the learner had demanded to be 
released. 
In other interviews, the impetus to hold participants to account led the interviewer to 
explicitly contest the participants’ attributions of responsibility.  In the next extract we see the 
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experimenter challenging the participant’s claim that the experimenter should be allocated all 
the responsibility.  However the participant, seemingly so submissive to the experimenter’s 
authority just a few moments earlier, refuses to change his position: 
 
Extract 6 (0214; 450v.) 
1 T: Er, well, basically I would have 
2  to say that er, you were 
3  responsible as the examiner, 
4  I was merely following your 
5  instructions and, of course, he 
6  had [no choice I mean] 
7 E:        [And yet you-] 
8 T: he did his best.  At least at the 
9  beginning anyway. 
10 E: Uhuh. 
11 T: So I would have to put the 
12  blame on you. 
13 E: The whole blame? 
14 T: I would say so. 
15 E: Well er as a matter of fact you 
16  could have er, could have got 
17  up, said no.  See I mean, and er 
18  and he volunteered so er, 
19  everyone has to share, er, well 
20  n- not everyone has to but, let’s 
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21  indicate on this pie. 
((24 lines omitted in which the experimenter explains the responsibility 
clock)) 
45 T: Well er, as you mentioned I 
46  could have possibly gotten up 
47  myself and would not have 
48  (?assumed?) any responsibility 
49  but, of course that never 
50  occurred to me I went along 
51  with the instructions so I’m, 
52  (?doing, with them?) all the way 
53  up. 
54 E: All right and that gives me all 
55  the responsibility? 
56 T: I gu-eh-ess it does. 
 
In the first part of the extract, the participant uses the obedience repertoire (line 4: ‘I 
was merely following your instructions’) as part of his rationale for attributing all of the 
responsibility for the learner being shocked against his will to the experimenter.  However, 
the experimenter does not take this at face value as a satisfactory response (line 13: ‘The 
whole blame?’).  When the participant re-states his position the experimenter begins to offer 
an alternative account.  Beginning with an appositional (‘well’; see above) on line 15, he 
notes that the participant could have refused to continue.  He frames this as something that 
should have been clear and obvious to the participant (line 15: ‘as a matter of fact’), and 
subsequently highlights the learner’s voluntary participation (lines 17-18) in order to further 
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demonstrate that other judgements may be just as plausible.  He then suggests that ‘everyone 
has to share’ responsibility (line 19), before quickly correcting himself (line 20).  This self-
correction can be heard as an orientation to having been too directive, and in moving on to 
using the responsibility clock/pie he moves away from attempting overtly to challenge the 
participant.  However, in continuing to attribute total responsibility to the experimenter, the 
participant now orients to the experimenter’s previously stated objections to his position (line 
45: ‘as you mentioned’) and proceeds to reject them by formulating an account of why he did 
not discontinue the experiment himself.  He does this by stating that the possibility ‘never 
occurred’ to him (lines 49-50), which insofar as it prioritises a lack of recognition of refusal 
as an option serves as an attempt to retain a moral identity as someone who didn’t continue 
out of malice but rather simply by virtue of not realising that ceasing was an option.  This is 
followed with a further use of the obedience repertoire (lines 50-51:  ‘I went along with the 
instructions’), to restate the extent to which he was simply doing as he was told, but in such a 
way as to downplay the experimenter’s agency.  Whereas previously the participant had 
constructed himself as having followed your instructions, following the experimenter’s 
provision of possible alternatives, it is simply the instructions themselves that were followed.  
As in extract 1, such a formulation attends to the delicate business of having to blame one’s 
interlocutor in order to minimise one’s own responsibility.  Moreover, in placing the blame 
on the ‘the instructions’, the participant allows for the possibility that in other contexts – ones 
in which no such instructions were present – he would have behaved differently.  His actions 
thus spring not from any deficiency of his own moral identity, but rather from the external 
contingencies of the situation, again anticipating Milgram’s own rejection of personality-
based explanations. 
This extract neatly demonstrates the two conflicting imperatives in the post-
experiment interviews, only one of which has been fully appreciated by theorists, including 
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Milgram himself.  In using the responsibility clock, Milgram was aiming to collect objective 
data concerning participants’ feelings of responsibility.  However, what has not typically 
been understood is the extent to which the interviews were also occasions for holding 
participants to account.  The interviews are thus best conceptualized as rhetorical encounters, 
with interviewers probing participants as to why they behaved as they did, and in doing so 
giving the impression that they ought to have acted differently; the participants accounted for 
their behaviour as best they could in the circumstances, but their responses need to be 




The present analysis constitutes an extension of the rhetorical perspective on the 
obedience experiments, which has to date focussed on the interactions in the experimental 
session itself.  In this previous research, it has been argued that the experimental interaction 
between experimenter and participant should be understood as a rhetorical encounter 
(Gibson, 2013a, 2014, 2017a); here, we suggest that the interactions in the post-experimental 
interviews should be seen in similar terms.  When discussing the issue of responsibility, the 
interviewer subtly – and sometimes not so subtly – probed in such a way as to make it clear 
to participants that they were accountable for their actions.  It is in this context that 
participants invoked obedience, and suggested that they were not responsible for their 
actions, and thus rather than conceptualising their responses as reflecting underlying 
psychological shifts, we should instead see them as situated social actions.  In this final 
concluding section we consider how this shift in perspective has the potential to re-orient our 
understanding of the experiments, and of obedience more broadly. 
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First, the shift to treating obedience in terms of a rhetorical device available for 
participants to deploy, rather than as an underlying psychological mechanism, highlights the 
value of studying social influence processes not only in straightforward causal terms, but as 
participants’ concerns that can be invoked, oriented to, and accounted for (Gibson & Smart, 
2017; Smart, 2013).  Allied to this is the shift from trying to work out what underlying 
psychological process was occurring in participants’ heads during the obedience experiments, 
to treating psychological matters themselves as things to be worked up and accounted for in 
the course of the experiments and post-experiment interviews.  This can be seen, for example, 
in the repeated mobilization of a disjuncture between underlying thought/feeling and outward 
behaviour/action in the interviews.  Interviewers could construct such an inconsistency as 
part of the process of holding participants to account; participants could in turn mobilize the 
inconsistency in order to assert that they may have done something that was problematic, but 
at least they hadn’t wanted to.  This enabled participants to present themselves as not being 
the type of person who would inflict pain on another human being, and in reifying these 
accounts Milgram was essentially choosing to believe statements that buttressed his general 
preference for situational explanations over ones based around personality.  Such selective 
reification (Potter, 1996) neglects the extent to which these accounts were bound up with 
self-presentational concerns in the immediate social context, and a more agnostic position on 
the referentiality of accounts overcomes this.  Such a perspective follows directly from the 
discursive psychological injunction to re-specify objects typically conceptualized as internal 
mental constructs as action-oriented social constructions (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  None of 
this is to deny that there may be something going on ‘under the skull’, but it points to the 
difficulty of inferring this from discourse.  Indeed, there is a fundamental circularity at work 
in the traditional use of these accounts as reports:  people are understood as not responsible 
for their actions because they say they are not responsible; yet the only evidence that people 
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are not responsible is these verbal accounts themselves.  Assurances that participant accounts 
offer a ‘spontaneous … and relatively uncensored glimpse into what participants were 
thinking’ (Burger et al., 2011, p. 461), or that they were not ‘alibi[s] concocted for the 
moment’ (Milgram, 1974, p. 146) thus miss the point and risk reproducing a naïvely realist 
perspective on the relationship between thought and language.  Given the moral issues 
involved in taking a perspective that effectively functions to absolve perpetrators of 
responsibility (Haslam & Reicher, 2006), at the very least a higher threshold of proof is 
required to demonstrate the psychological shifts purported in traditional accounts of 
Milgram’s experiments. 
Second, this analysis adds to recent debates concerning the nature of the phenomena 
captured in Milgram’s experiments, and indeed the nature of obedience itself.  It is clear from 
recent research that, whatever the experiments do show, they are not demonstrations of 
people following orders in the usual sense of that term (Burger et al., 2011; Gibson, 2013a; 
Haslam, Reicher & Birney, 2014).  The experimental procedure required much more delicate 
rhetorical work than merely the issuing of blunt orders in order to ensure participants 
continued.  This implies that the extent to which people administered the shocks depends on 
much more subtle features of the experimental context than the standard interpretation would 
imply.  The issue of whether this means that the experiments are not demonstrations of 
obedience, however, depends on the conflation of obedience with following 
orders/commands.  The standard social psychological definition of obedience certainly 
requires orders/commands for something to be understood in terms of obedience, but the key 
question is arguably whether this was ever a particularly good definition of obedience 
(Gibson, 2017b).  In everyday language we might, for example, speak of obeying the law, but 
we do not need direct orders to do so.  Rather, the act of obedience depends on shared social 
conventions and norms.  At a more theoretical level, we need only consider Foucault’s (1979) 
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classic work on the way in which disciplinary power is exercised in contemporary societies to 
see that the most successful form of obedience is that which can be elicited without the need 
for the administration of anything so blunt as a direct command.  Far better that people come 
to assume that their conduct is always potentially available for sanction and regulate their 
own behaviour accordingly.  There is thus a need to refine and re-think the discipline’s 
conceptualization not only of the Milgram experiments, but of obedience more broadly.  
Moreover, there is a separate analytic project to be undertaken exploring what counts 
explicitly as obedience in particular contexts, and how this is constructed by social actors 
across a range of situations.  What can be said, however, is that the classic social 
psychological version of obedience as superior orders is present in Milgram’s experiments 
after all, but in a rather different way than has typically been assumed.  Rather than a process 
of social influence which facilitates an agentic shift in participants, it is instead present as a 
participants’ resource for use in accounting for their behaviour.  Indeed, there is a 
fundamental irony in that Milgram’s work is held as the exemplar par excellence of the 
extent to which people underestimate the importance of social context as a determinant of 
behaviour, and yet Milgram and generations of subsequent theorists have neglected the extent 
to which the situation in which participants found themselves immediately after the 
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Appendix:  Transcription conventions. 
 Speakers are identified as E (Experimenter); T (Teacher; the naïve participant); L 
(Learner); SM (Stanley Milgram). 
 Commas are used to indicate brief pauses of less than a second. 
 Longer silences are indicated with a number in brackets.  The number indicates the 
length of the silence, in seconds, rounded to the nearest whole second. 
 Square brackets are used to indicate overlapping talk. 
 A dash is used to indicate a sharp cut-off of the preceding sound. 
 Question marks are used to indicate a questioning intonation, rather than a 
grammatical question as such. 
 Full stops are used to indicate a stopping intonation, rather than the end of a sentence 
as such. 
 Laughter particles are indicated by ‘Eh heh’. 
 Double parentheses are used to indicate comments from the transcriber. 
 Question marks enclosed in single parentheses are used to indicate words that were 
not clearly audible, but which represent the transcriber’s best guess at what was said. 
 
